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Autonomous agents are not so diﬃcult to construct. Constructing autonomous agents that
will work as required is much harder. A clear way in which we can design and analyse
autonomous systems so that we can be more conﬁdent that their behaviour is as required
is to use formal methods. These can, in principle, allow us to exactly specify the behaviour
of the agent, and verify that any implementation has the properties required. In addition to
using a more formal approach, it is clear that problems of conceptualisation and analysis
can be aided by the use of an appropriate abstraction.
In this article we tackle one particular aspect of formal methods for agent-based systems,
namely the formal representation and implementation of deliberation within agents. The
key aspect here is simplicity. Agents are speciﬁed using a relatively simple temporal logic
and are executed by directly interpreting such temporal formulae. Deliberation is captured
by modifying the way in which execution handles its temporal goals. Thus, in this article
we provide motivations, theoretical underpinnings, implementation details, correctness
arguments, and comparisons with related work.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The rapid growth of both the Internet and Grid Computing, together with the inappropriateness of traditional ap-
proaches to developing complex, distributed applications, has led to the increasingly widespread adoption of new, multi-
agent solutions [57,60]. The abstraction central to such approaches is that of an agent, which is typically an autonomous
software component, communicating and cooperating with other agents in order to achieve common goals [62]. This tech-
nology has been particularly successful in producing distributed systems where centralised control is either impractical or
undesirable. Not only is the ability of agents to act autonomously vital, but such agents are often required to dynamically
adapt to unforeseen circumstances and to work cooperatively with other agents in order to overcome problems. In this
sense, such agents are truly autonomous, being responsible for deliberating over a range of possibilities and for deciding
on their own course of action. Consequently, agent technology has been applied in a wide variety of areas, from industrial
process control to cooperative information retrieval [32,1].
While considerable research has been carried out concerning the development of theories of agency, negotiation and
cooperation, notably BDI [48] and KARO [40], there are few high-level languages for representing such agents. Although
some alternatives are described in Section 6.1, most agent systems are developed directly in Java. While this is a general
purpose solution, and indeed agent shells have been developed for Java [58,31,3], this approach is often characterised by
the absence of a clear semantics for the agent activity, and a lack of clarity concerning exactly what deliberative aspects are
involved.
This lack of appropriate high-level, semantically clear, agent programming languages often means that implemented
systems have very little connection with high-level agent theories, such as BDI [48], though there are notable attempts
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there is, as yet, little evidence of a formal engineering approach to the development of agent-based systems that can truly
bridge the gap between theory and implementation [8]; our work is a further step in this direction. In essence, since
traditional programming languages typically lack the ﬂexibility to handle, clearly and concisely, high-level deliberation such
as an agent’s dynamic control of its own behaviour, we aim to provide a high-level language supporting the principled
development of such agent-based systems, from logical theory to implemented system.
1.1. Content
In this article, we describe one particular approach to the formalisation and implementation of agent-based systems. Our
aim here is to use high-level logical speciﬁcations for agents, then directly execute such speciﬁcations. This work is part of
the programme of research developing the Imperative Future paradigm [2] for use in agent-based systems [17]. In particular,
we here consolidate and extend the work originally presented in [19] on representing and implementing deliberative aspects,
describing:
1. the use of a simple temporal logic to provide agent behaviours, including both reactive and deliberative elements;
2. an algorithm (implemented in Prolog) for executing such temporal descriptions;
3. the representation of goals by temporal eventualities and the use of orderings between goals to capture rational delib-
eration;
4. the implementation of such orderings both within the underlying Prolog and at the meta-level;
5. correctness arguments for the execution of deliberation via goal ordering; and
6. a range of examples, indicating how such deliberation can be utilised.
The core aspect of our work can be summarised as follows. Within temporal logic [15], the ‘♦ ’ operator represents the
concept of “at some moment in the future”. Thus, a formula such as ‘♦paper_completed’ represents the constraint that, at
some moment in the future the paper will be completed. While such a formula gives a declarative description of dynamic
behaviour, the Imperative Future paradigm provides a way of directly executing such formulae to actually ensure that we
do make paper_completed true at some time in the future. In this sense, we can see simple formulae containing ‘♦ ’ as
representing goals that must be achieved. Given such descriptions, we can utilise an execution mechanism for directly
executing logical formulae. The core execution mechanism actually maintains a list outstanding goals, or eventualities, such
as paper_completed, and endeavours to make each one true as soon as possible. In doing so, those goals at the head of the
list are attempted ﬁrst. Now, by providing a mechanism for dynamically re-ordering such a goal list, we essentially have a
way of changing the order in which the agent attempts to achieve goals. In this sense, such a re-ordering implements agent
deliberation; a full description of this approach is given in this article.
As mentioned above, we here extend, combine and consolidate work on executable agent speciﬁcations [17] and delib-
erative agent speciﬁcations [19,30]. As such, this work contributes to research into agent theory, by providing a logical basis
for representing deliberative agents, programming language design, providing an intuitive language for implementing delib-
erative agents, and software engineering, by providing a framework of developing agent-based systems based on executable
speciﬁcations.
1.2. Structure
The structure of this article is as follows. We begin, in Section 2, by describing our view of agents and multi-agent
systems, and present our desiderata for a description language for agent-based systems. Such a language is developed, in
Section 3, for describing agents using temporal logic and implementing these agents via direct execution. In Section 4,
we address the problem of representing and implementing deliberation between goals in a high-level manner, principally
by introducing the concept of priority functions for dynamically re-ordering goals. During this, we not only contrast our
executable descriptions with the standard BDI model of rational agency (Section 4.3) but also provide correctness arguments
(Section 4.5). In Section 5, implementation aspects are presented, as are a number of examples. Finally, in Section 6 we
provide concluding remarks and outline related and future work.
2. Agent-based systems
There is widespread use of the term ‘agent’, ranging from being identical to the concept of ‘object’ to being “an encap-
sulated entity with ‘traditional’ AI capabilities” [62]. So variable is its usage that, in some areas, the term itself is seen as
being meaningless. The view we take here is that, while the key aspect of an object is encapsulation of state and (some)
behaviour, agents are truly autonomous. Thus, an agent not only has control over its own state, but also can dynamically
change its patterns of behaviour and communication as execution progresses (for example by ‘learning’ or ‘forgetting’), and
so can choose what form of interactions it presents to its environment. In this sense, the agent abstraction captures the core
elements of autonomous systems.
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agent is that, since it is autonomous, it has some motivation for acting in the way it does. The decisions the rational agent
makes, based on these dynamic motivations, should be both ‘reasonable’ and ‘justiﬁable’. Just as the use of agents is now
seen as an essential tool in representing, understanding and implementing complex software systems, so the characterisation
of complex components as rational agents allows the system designer to work at a much higher level of abstraction. Since
we are here concerned with deliberative aspects, we will term the rational agents we examine simply as deliberative agents.
Agents of the above form, autonomously (and asynchronously) executing, reside in an environment consisting of other
agents. The only interaction between such agents occurs through message-passing and, through this simple communication
mechanism, agents can be organised into a variety of structures. As it is often the case that agents must work together,
these structures typically support cooperative activity. While we will not address such dynamic organisations of agents in
this article, we note that they can take many different forms, such as groups [38,22], teams [34,53,43,35,23] and organisa-
tions [25,16,64,56].
2.1. Requirements for agent description languages
In representing the internal behaviour of an individual agent, we argue that a notation satisfying most, if not all, of the
following criteria is required.
• It should be high-level, yet concise, consisting of a small range of powerful constructs.
• It should possess a semantics that is both intuitive and, if possible, obvious from the syntax of the language.
• It should be able to represent not only the static, but the dynamic, behaviour of agents.
• It should impose as few operational constraints upon the system designer as possible (for example, concurrent activities
within a single agent should be allowable and agents should be able to reside in an open, asynchronously executing,
environment).
In representing an individual agent’s behaviour, we choose to utilise a formal logic. One of the advantages of following such
an approach is that the notation has a well-deﬁned, and usually well understood, semantics. The use of a formal logic
language also allows us to narrow the gap between the agent descriptions and agent theory in that the semantics of an
agent is close to that of its logical description. This allows for the possibility of employing both speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation
techniques based upon formal logic in the development of agent-based systems.
As we are considering rational agents, we impose additional requirements for describing, and reasoning about, rational
behaviour at a high level. We note that the predominant rational agent theories all share similar elements, in particular
• an informational component, such as being able to represent an agent’s beliefs or knowledge,
• a dynamic component, allowing the representation of dynamic activity, and
• a motivational component, often representing the agents desires, intentions or goals.
For the deliberative agents we are concerned with, we will omit the ﬁrst of these, but note that this informational compo-
nent is usually formalised using logics of knowledge or belief [41,46,55].
The remaining aspects are typically represented logically by temporal or dynamic logics (dynamism), and modal logics
of intentions, desires or wishes (motivation). Thus, the predominant approaches to rational agent theory use relevant com-
binations, for example the BDI model [45] uses branching-time temporal logic (CTL) combined with modal logics of desire
(KD) and intention (KD), while the KARO framework [40] uses dynamic logic (PDL) combined with a modal logic of wishes
(KD).
Unfortunately, many of these combinations become too complex (not only undecidable, but incomplete) to be used in
practical situations. As we shall see later, our framework represents a simpler (and more tractable) logical basis for many
aspects of deliberative agents.
3. Temporal representation and execution
In this section we will describe the basic temporal framework, which is an adaption of our earlier work on executable
temporal logics [2]. The aspects particular to the representation of deliberative activity, as outlined in Section 2.1, will be
addressed speciﬁcally in Section 4.
While a general logic-based approach satisﬁes many of the criteria in Section 2.1, we choose to use temporal logic as
the basis of our formal description of agent behaviour. Temporal logic is a form of non-classical logic where a model of
time provides the basis for the notation. In our case, a simple discrete, linear sequence of moments is used as the basic
temporal model, with each moment in this temporal sequence being a model for classical logic. Such a temporal logic is
more powerful than the corresponding classical logic, is still tractable (at least in the propositional case) and, as we shall
describe, is useful for the description of dynamic behaviour in agent-based systems.
We begin with a brief introduction to (propositional, discrete, linear) temporal logic; see [15].
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〈σ , i〉 | true 〈σ , i〉 | false
〈σ , i〉 | start ⇔ i = 0
〈σ , i〉 | ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ 〈σ , i〉 | ϕ and 〈σ , i〉 | ψ
〈σ , i〉 | ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ 〈σ , i〉 | ϕ or 〈σ , i〉 | ψ
〈σ , i〉 | ¬ϕ ⇔ 〈σ , i〉 | ϕ
〈σ , i〉 | ©ϕ ⇔ 〈σ , i + 1〉 | ϕ
〈σ , i〉 |♦ϕ ⇔ there exists a k ∈N such that k i and 〈σ ,k〉 | ϕ
〈σ , i〉 |ϕ ⇔ for all j ∈N, if j i then 〈σ , j〉 | ϕ
〈σ , i〉 | ϕUψ ⇔ there exists a k ∈N, such that k i and 〈σ ,k〉 | ψ
and for all j ∈N, if i j < k then 〈σ , j〉 | ϕ
〈σ , i〉 | ϕWψ ⇔ either 〈σ , i〉 | ϕUψ or 〈σ , i〉 |ϕ
Fig. 1. Semantics of propositional discrete linear temporal logic.
3.1. Propositional temporal logic
The basic deﬁnition of each agent will be given by a temporal logic speciﬁcation [37]. As the temporal logic used here is
based on a linear, discrete model, time is represented as an inﬁnite sequence of discrete ‘moments’, with an identiﬁed start-
ing point, called “the beginning of time”. Classical formulae are used to represent constraints within individual moments,
while temporal formulae represent constraints between moments. Examples of temporal operators are:
♦ϕ is satisﬁed now if ϕ is satisﬁed at some moment in the future;
ϕ is satisﬁed now if ϕ is satisﬁed in all moments in the future;
ϕUψ is satisﬁed now if ϕ is satisﬁed from now until a future moment when ψ is satisﬁed;
©ϕ is satisﬁed now if ϕ is satisﬁed at the next moment in time;
start is only satisﬁed at the beginning of time.
Formally, formulae are constructed using the following connectives and proposition symbols.
• A set, P , of propositional symbols.
• Nullary connectives, true, false and start.
• Propositional connectives, ¬, ∨, ∧, and ⇒.
• Temporal connectives, © , ♦ ,  , U , and W .
The set of well-formed formulae of the logic, denoted by wff, is inductively deﬁned as the smallest set satisfying:
• any element of P is in wff, as are true, false and start;
• if ϕ and ψ are in wff then so are
¬ϕ ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ ⇒ ψ ♦ϕ ϕ ϕUψ ϕWψ © ϕ
An eventuality is deﬁned as a wff of the form ♦ϕ , while a state formula is a wff containing no temporal operators.
As mentioned above, the semantics of this logic is standard [26] with formulae being interpreted over structures isomor-
phic to the Natural Numbers, N. Thus, a model, σ , can be characterised as a sequence of moments or states
σ = s0, s1, s2, s3, . . .
where each state, si , is a set of propositions representing those satisﬁed in the ith moment in time. As formulae in this
logic are interpreted at a particular state in the sequence (i.e. at a particular moment in time), the notation
〈σ , i〉 | ϕ
denotes the truth (or otherwise) of formula ϕ in the model σ at moment i ∈ N. If there is some σ such that 〈σ ,0〉 | ϕ ,
then ϕ is said to be satisﬁable. If 〈σ ,0〉 | ϕ for all models, σ , then ϕ is said to be valid and is written | ϕ . Note that
formulae here are interpreted at time 0; this is an alternative, but equivalent, deﬁnition to the one commonly used [15].
Given this form of interpretation, the semantics of formulae in wff are given in Fig. 1.
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As an agent’s behaviour is represented by a temporal logic formula, the formula can be transformed into the temporal
normal form, SNF [18]. This process not only removes the majority of the temporal operators within the logic, but also
translates the formula into a set of rules suitable either for execution or veriﬁcation. A formula translated into SNF is of the
form
n∧
i=1
Ri
where each Ri is of one of the following varieties.
start ⇒
r∨
j=1
mj
q∧
i=1
ki ⇒ ©
r∨
j=1
mj
q∧
i=1
ki ⇒ ♦ l
These are termed initial, step and eventuality rules, respectively.
3.3. Why use temporal logic?
There are a number of reasons for using temporal logic to describe the dynamic behaviour of agents, some of which we
outline below.
• The discrete linear model structure that is the basis of the logic is very intuitive, corresponding to discrete steps in an
execution sequence with an identiﬁed starting state and an inﬁnite (linear) execution.
• The logic contains the core elements for describing the behaviour of basic dynamic execution. For example, it contains
three main descriptive elements: a declarative description of the current state; an imperative description of transitions
that might occur between the current and the next states; and a description of situations that will occur at some,
indeterminate, state in the future.
Thus, using this logic, we are able to describe the behaviour of an agent now, in transition to the next moment in time
and at some time in the future.
• The basic set of concepts within SNF are suﬃcient as more complex temporal properties can be translated into SNF [18].
Thus, a general temporal speciﬁcation can be given and transformed into a set of rules of this basic form.
As we shall see in Section 4, of particular importance, both in the representation of dynamic behaviour and in the execution
of such temporal formulae, is the simplicity of the logic. We will not provide a more detailed description of the temporal
logic used, nor of the exact transformations used in our approach (for a more detailed description, see [18]).
3.4. Representing individual agents
The basic elements of our approach, namely agents, each comprise two elements: an interface deﬁnition and an internal
deﬁnition. The deﬁnition of which messages an agent recognises, which messages an agent may itself produce, and what
parameters the agent has, is provided by the interface deﬁnition, for example
searcher
in: new_search, add_resources, terminate
out: found, need_resources
Here, {new_search, add_resources, terminate} is the set of messages that the ‘searcher’ agent recognises, while
{found, need_resources} is the set of messages the agent is able to produce. We will say little more about such
interface deﬁnitions in this article — they mainly come into play within multi-agent scenarios [30,20]. The key element we
are concerned with is the agent’s internal deﬁnition, which is given directly as a set of SNF formulae. As an example of a
simple set of formulae which might be part of the searcher agent’s description, consider the following.
start ⇒ ¬searching
new_search ⇒ ♦searching
(searching∧ new_search) ⇒ © (found∨ need_resources)
228 M. Fisher / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 223–238Here, searching is false at the beginning of time and whenever new_search is true (for example, if a new_search
message has just been received), a commitment to eventually make searching true is given. Similarly, whenever both
new_search and searching are true, then either found or need_resources will be made true in the next moment
in time.
3.5. Executing temporal agent descriptions
One way to ensure that agents are implemented according to their logical semantics, and also provide a clear link
between the agent theory and the agent speciﬁcation, is to directly execute the temporal logic speciﬁcation [17]. This move
towards executable logic speciﬁcations further narrows the gap between the actual implementation of the language and
the theory underlying the system. In our case, execution of a formula, ϕ , of a logic, L, means constructing a model, M,
for ϕ , i.e. M |L ϕ . Thus, during execution, we are attempting to construct a model for the formula corresponding to the
speciﬁcation (i.e. the set of SNF rules).
So, we have that temporal logic formulae (i.e. SNF rules) are used to specify agents and are directly executed in order
to implement these agents. For this to be successful, we must be sure that the execution algorithm implements temporal
logic formulae correctly. To do this, we use the imperative future paradigm [2]. Here, a forward-chaining process is employed,
using information about both the history of the agent’s execution and its current set of rules in order to constrain its future
execution.
The key element in this form of execution is the sometime operator, ‘♦ ’, which is used to represent basic temporal
indeterminacy. When a formula such as ‘♦ϕ ’ is executed, the system must attempt to ensure that ϕ eventually becomes
true. As such eventualities might not be able to be satisﬁed immediately, a record of the outstanding eventualities must be
kept, so that they can be re-tried as execution proceeds. (As we will see later, this record is implemented as an ordered
list.) The standard heuristic used is to attempt to satisfy, at each state, as many eventualities as possible, starting with the
oldest outstanding eventuality [2]. A slightly more detailed execution algorithm is given below (see also [2]).
Here, the execution mechanism attempts to build a model for a set of SNF clauses comprising Initial, Step, and Eventuality
subsets, as follows.
1. Make a (consistent) choice of assignments for propositional symbols in the Initial set of clauses; label this as S0 and let
E0 =< >.
2. Given Si and Ei , proceed to construct Si+1 and Ei+1 as follows:
(a) let C = {F | (P ⇒ © F ) ∈ Step and Si | P }, i.e., C represents the Step constraints on Si+1
(b) let Ei+1 = Eî 〈V | (Q ⇒ ♦ V ) ∈ Eventuality and Si | Q 〉, i.e., Ei+1 is the previous list of outstanding eventualities,
extended with all the new eventualities generated in Si
(c) for each V ∈ Ei+1, starting at the head of the list, Ei+1, if (V ∧ C) is consistent, then let C = (V ∧ C) and remove V
from Ei+1
(d) choose an assignment consistent with C and label this Si+1
(e) loop check:
if an eventuality within Ei+1 has occurred identically in the previous N states then fail and backtrack to a previous
choice point (if no previous choice points are available, terminate the execution)
(f) go to (2)
Thus, the execution mechanism is allowed to backtrack. As the agent has a range of non-deterministic choices, it can, if it
ﬁnds a contradiction, backtrack to a previous choice point and continue executing but on the basis of a different choice. It
can also (see (e) above) be forced to backtrack if the same eventuality has been outstanding for N steps. The bound, N , is
generated from the size of the formula being executed and this effectively ensures that, if an eventuality could have been
satisﬁed, it could have been satisﬁed by this moment in time (on some execution sequence).
The execution of basic temporal speciﬁcations of the above form allows us to specify and implement a variety of dynamic
behaviours. In particular, it allows us to develop both reactive and planning behaviours and, by allowing concurrent activities
within an individual agent, we are able to represent behaviour that is a combination of these aspects. Thus, agents can react
immediately to certain stimuli, but can be carrying out a longer term planning process in the background.
3.6. Examples
Reaction rules. An agent can contain a range of transition rules representing reactive situations, such as
low_fuel ⇒ ©alert
detect_object ⇒ ©record_object
Note that a response occurs here in the next step of the agent and so a variety of immediate responses can be represented.
As well as being useful for reactive architectures in Distributed AI and multi-agent systems, such rules can be used as part
of more traditional applications, such as process control.
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problem ⇒ ♦plan
plan ⇒ ©announce_solution
which states that at some time in the future the agent will have generated a plan to solve a particular problem and,
when it does, the agent will inform others than a solution has been found. An agent might construct the plan, using
♦plan, as above, but adding clauses constraining the production of the plan. For example, if we are to attempt to plan
♦paper_completed, then we might have pre-conditions such as text_completed and bibliography_completed,
and so might require
¬text_completed ⇒ ©¬paper_completed
¬bibliography_completed ⇒ ©¬paper_completed
which state that paper_completed cannot be achieved if either of the distinct preconditions text_completed and
bibliography_completed have not been achieved. These preconditions might themselves be turned into sub-goals
with
¬paper_completed ⇒ ♦text_completed
¬paper_completed ⇒ ♦bibliography_completed
meaning that if the paper is not yet completed, then ♦text_completed and ♦bibliography_completed are sub-
goals.
Aside: planning and reaction. Thus, as above, we can attempt to utilise the deductive and backtracking aspects of the system
in order to achieve the construction of a plan (a further option may be to utilise meta-level control features [2]). Note,
however, that when agents are part of an open multi-agent system, backtracking past the broadcast of a message is not
allowed [20]. This allows agents to carry out search through backtracking internally, but avoids the problem of attempting
to rollback actions in a distributed system. Thus, once an agent has broadcast a message, it has effectively committed its
execution to that choice. Because of this, the designer must be careful when developing systems comprising both planning
and reaction aspects as the planning rules might call for search to continue, while the reaction rules might call for an
immediate communication.
Again, there are a number of approaches that could be adopted here. When we require an agent that has both planning
and reactive capabilities, one approach is to spawn a separate ‘planning’ agent which carries out the planning activity in
parallel with the original agent. The original agent acts reactively to its environment, having spawned the planning agent,
but once the planning agent has succeeded in producing a plan the original agent is at liberty to act upon it. An alternative
approach is for the user to specify the agent in such a way that it only commits to an execution path (i.e. via broadcast
communication) once the search for a solution to the planning problem has terminated. Here, agent execution is typically
characterised as periods of internal (backtracking) computation, interleaved with communication events.
4. Representing and executing deliberation
We will now extend the basic execution approach to handle the key property of being able to reason about, and manip-
ulate, goals. As remarked above, this deliberative activity is the central aspect of rational agents. Not only are such agents
able to generate, and attempt to achieve, their own goals, they are also able to modify how subsequent goals are attempted,
depending on the situation. To some extent, we have seen this in the planning examples in the previous section. It is this
ability to control when, and how, goals are attempted that captures the form of deliberation we are interested in.
4.1. Deliberation examples
To motivate further the need for deliberation, let us now consider two simple examples.
Vehicle navigation. First, we examine a simple agent navigating a vehicle. The agent has
• information about the local terrain,
• information concerning target destinations, and
• motivations, such as to get to a destination, to avoid obstacles, to continue moving until a destination is reached, etc.
The agent must dynamically deliberate over (possibly conﬂicting) goals in order to decide what actions (for example, move-
ment) to take and, based on its current state, generate new goals (for example to add a new destination) or revise its
current goals.
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generates all these as goals. The agent keeps trying to be famous, but realises that it is does not know how to achieve this
and so chooses to try one of its other goals. Thus, the agent then tries to satisfy the goal of eating lunch but realises that
the sub-goal of making lunch must be achieved ﬁrst. Consequently, the agent generates a goal to make lunch and attempts
this next.
And so on. The agent must change between its goals dynamically in order to produce the required behaviour.
4.2. Deliberation via dynamic goal ordering
As we can see from the above examples, goals must be manipulated in quite ﬂexible ways. We intend to achieve delib-
eration via a re-ordering of goals within the temporal execution mechanism.
Recall that, in the basic execution framework, there is a ﬁxed strategy for implementing eventualities (for example ‘♦ g ’),
namely to attempt to satisfy the oldest outstanding eventuality ﬁrst. In the earlier algorithm, this involves keeping a list of
outstanding eventualities (called Ei), attempting them in order and always adding new eventualities to the end of this list.
Because we want to provide signiﬁcant additional ﬂexibility in the manipulation of eventualities, we now add the possibility
of re-ordering this goal/eventuality list between execution steps.
Since the implementation is provided within Prolog, the deﬁnition of such a goal re-ordering function is relatively simple.
All we need to do is to provide a function that transforms the list of outstanding eventualities remaining from a state into
another list for use in the next state. Such a function obviously takes the original list of eventualities as an argument and
produces a new list of eventualities. However, the function can take many other arguments, for example the history of the
execution so far, and so such functions can be very powerful. Further details and examples are provided in Section 5, but to
summarise, we have a user-deﬁned strategy/function for deciding which eventualities to attempt ﬁrst/next, by the repeated
use of, for example,
Ei+1 = priority_function(Ei,History).
4.3. Comparison with BDI deliberation
Since the BDI approach is the predominant mechanism for representing rational agents and describing deliberation
within these agents, it is informative to compare our approach with the BDI one [19].
Since its inception, many real-world agent-based systems have been based upon the BDI philosophy [32], originally
the PRS [27], but subsequently systems such as dMARS [33,13] and Interrap [24] and high-proﬁle applications such as Air
Traﬃc Control [48] and Space Probe Monitoring [42]. In addition, there are a number of extensions of Java [28] incorporating
aspects of the BDI architecture [47], such as the JACK language [31]. The BDI model is by now the predominant approach to
agent architectures and, indeed, is widely used for high-level control in practical autonomous systems.
The BDI model of rational agency [46] is an agent framework whereby individual rational agents are described in terms
of their “mental attitudes” of Belief, Desire and Intention (BDI). Belief is used to represent the information state of an agent,
while the other two characterise the agent’s motivational state. The difference between desires and intentions is really in
the way they are used — desires are longer term motivations for the agent, while intentions are really the goals the agent
is currently tackling.
In BDI systems, for example the PRS [48], deliberation consists of two aspects: deciding which desires will become
intentions; and deciding how to achieve those intentions. We can capture this via two functions:
intentions = deliberate1(desires, information)
actions = deliberate2(intentions, information)
Here, deliberate1 effectively decides which desires to examine ﬁrst (as intentions), while deliberate2 decides which intentions
to actively pursue. Both functions also examine the information the agent has about the world, its plans, previous goals, etc.
In our approach, desires and intentions are both represented by eventualities. As we will see later, we can treat eventu-
alities differently depending on whether we see them as long-term, or immediate, goals. Thus, we see it as a very natural
mechanism for representing both intentions and desires to use temporal eventualities (though Bratman [9] takes a different
view). These are required to be satisﬁed eventually (if consistent), can be conﬂicting (for example ♦ϕ and ♦¬ϕ is not
inconsistent), and the execution must manipulate them in order to generate future execution.
Thus, once we choose to identify both desires and intentions as eventualities, then the deliberate1 and deliberate2 func-
tions effectively work on eventualities and this idea of deliberation ﬁts very naturally with our view of re-ordering lists of
eventualities. Since the re-ordering function can be implemented by arbitrary Prolog code, the re-ordering carried out can
be very ﬂexible.
In Section 4.4 we will consider a BDI-like example in more detail.
4.4. Performing deliberation
In order to explain our approach to deliberation further, we will consider the “dining and wishing” example from Sec-
tion 4.1. As well as showing how the re-ordering of lists of eventualities using a priority function can be useful, we will also
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deliberation.
Recall that, from this example, there are four goals that the agent has, captured within a list of eventualities. For a
comparison with the BDI approach, let us consider these as desires:
Desires = [♦be_famous,♦ sleep,♦eat_lunch,♦make_lunch]
If we were to take the next step in the execution at this point, the eventualities would be attempted in order, beginning with
♦be_famous. However, we wish to carry out some deliberation by re-ordering the list before we go ahead with execution.
So, before proceeding to (attempt to) build the next state in the execution, we apply an ordering function. This might
capture the view that we wish to ensure that the most important goal appears ﬁrst and, again appealing to BDI notation,
we might view these as intentions (remember, though, that they are all still just temporal eventualities):
Intentions = [♦be_famous,♦eat_lunch,♦ sleep,♦make_lunch]
Thus, the ordering function exchanged ♦eat_lunch and ♦ sleep. We can view the ordering function as capturing deliberation
from desires to intentions, characterising the agent’s view of what goals are currently most important.
Given that ordering functions can use any information available in order to decide upon a new ordering, we might apply
a second such function assessing what plans are available to achieve the goals. Thus, this function might re-order the list to
the following list to be attempted.
Attempt = [♦make_lunch,♦eat_lunch,♦ sleep,♦be_famous]
Thus, here ♦be_famous has been relegated to the end of the list since we do not have a plan capable of achieving be_famous.
The next most important goal was ♦eat_lunch. However, a precondition for achieving this is make_lunch and so ♦make_lunch
is moved to the front of the list. And so on.
In this way, the original list of outstanding eventualities has been re-ordered based on various criteria relevant to the
agent. The subsequent list of eventualities is then used in the choice of the next state as normal. It is important to note that,
in general, there is just one ordering function used between each step in the execution. However, in the above example we
have split this into two component functions in order to emphasise the ability to capture BDI-like deliberation [19]. (Indeed,
in [19], the two functions were termed the desire priority function and intention priority function, respectively.)
We will next consider correctness questions that arise with the use of ordering/priority functions.
4.5. Correctness
Correctness of the basic execution mechanism, as described in Section 3.5, is given by the following result when a set of
SNF rules R is executed.
Theorem 4.1. (See [2].) If a set of SNF rules, R, is executed using the above algorithm, then a model for R will be generated if, and only
if, R is satisﬁable.
Note here that one of the crucial aspects is the proviso, given in part (2c) of the algorithm, that eventualities are
attempted in order according to their position in the list Ei . The standard approach, given in [2], is that the list is ordered
by age with the oldest outstanding eventuality occurring ﬁrst. In the proof, this ensures that no eventuality is outstanding
inﬁnitely, yet only attempted a ﬁnite number of times.
Once the eventuality ordering mechanism is extended to include arbitrary ordering functions, as in Section 4.2, then a
more general version of the above theorem is required.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Fair ordering strategy). A fair ordering strategy is a mechanism for re-ordering lists of eventualities between
each execution step that ensures that if an eventuality is outstanding for an inﬁnite number of steps, then at some point in
the execution that eventuality will continually be attempted.
Note that we here mean the same eventuality. If we keep on satisfying an eventuality and then re-generating it as a new
goal then this is a different eventuality for the purposes of the above.
Theorem 4.2. If a set of SNF rules, R, is executed using the above algorithm, with a fair ordering strategy at step (2c), then a model for
R will be generated if, and only if, R is satisﬁable.
Proof (Outline). Since the only real distinction between this theorem and Theorem 4.1 above is the execution of eventu-
alities, then we simply focus on this. Consider one eventuality from Ei . Either the eventuality is satisﬁable or it is not. If
the eventuality is unsatisﬁable execution will fail to satisfy this at any time. By the fair ordering deﬁnition above, we know
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some point, loop checking will be applied and a different path will be attempted.
If the eventuality is satisﬁable then either it is satisﬁed now or it keeps on being outstanding until (again by the fair
ordering deﬁnition) it will be continually attempted. Either this leads to the satisfaction of this eventuality, or backtracking
is forced and a satisfying situation will be found.
Thus, the fair ordering strategy restriction imposes a form of fairness on the choice mechanism. While this proviso effec-
tively means that we can potentially explore every possibility during execution, the incorporation (in the algorithm) of a
bound (N) on the number of states that eventualities can remain outstanding, together with the ﬁnite model property of
the logic, ensures that all of the possible states in the model will be explored if necessary.
So, the question remains: are typical ordering functions fair ordering strategies, or is this constraint too restrictive? We
should ﬁrst note that the basic strategy of ordering the list of eventualities in terms of the oldest outstanding eventuality
does, indeed, correspond to a fair ordering strategy.
Lemma 1. The strategy of re-ordering the list of eventualities in terms of the oldest outstanding eventualities is a fair ordering strategy.
Proof. Essentially this follows since, if an eventuality remains outstanding but unsatisﬁed, it will eventually be attempted
an inﬁnite number of times. All eventualities earlier in the list would either be satisﬁed (and so be removed from the head
of the list) or would also remain unsatisﬁed inﬁnitely. In the latter case, these earlier eventualities would not stop the
eventuality in question being attempted. 
4.6. A simpliﬁed approach: using ‘prefer’ functions
In general, if we are to implement a function for ordering a list (for example, a list of eventualities), then we must
have a predicate for comparing elements within the list. Typically, this is a version of ‘<’ over the type of elements in
the list. Rather than deﬁning the ordering function explicitly, or even providing a full deﬁnition of ‘<’, the approach taken
in [30] is to simply deﬁne the ‘<’ predicate for selected pairs. In this case the ‘<’ predicate is actually called ‘prefer’ and
such preference statements occur explicitly within the speciﬁcation rather than as part of the implementation. Thus, for the
example above, we might have
prefer(be_famous,make_lunch),
prefer(be_famous,eat_lunch),
prefer(make_lunch,eat_lunch).
The execution mechanism then uses this information to re-order the list of eventualities at each step. This approach has
a number of advantages. It is simple and direct — the speciﬁer need not write Prolog ordering functions and, indeed, the
implementation need not be in Prolog at all (the implementation used in [30] is in Java!). However, with this simplicity
comes problems. Although the three prefer relationships above are enough to re-order the ‘desires’ list in our example into
the ﬁnal list of ‘attempts’, there is no guarantee that any set of prefer relationships will indeed produce a unique linear order.
This is not so much of a problem if, as in [30], we are prepared to accept any ordering consistent with the preferences.
However, what if there is no consistent ordering, as in the following.
prefer(be_famous,make_lunch),
prefer(eat_lunch,be_famous),
prefer(make_lunch,eat_lunch).
In [30], little is done about this as it is seen as the responsibility of the speciﬁer to ensure consistency. However, in a more
comprehensive approach, further analysis of the preference structures would be carried out.
For the moment, however, we will return to the explicit deﬁnition of ordering functions, and will next consider the
practical implementation of various deliberation strategies, returning to the question of whether such ordering functions are
fair, in the sense above.
5. Practical deliberation
So, we here discuss the practical implementation of goal ordering strategies, particularly consider whether they are fair,
in the sense above.
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The system is implemented in Prolog, using techniques from [2,19]. While we will not go into detail here, we just note
that the algorithm from Section 3.5 is essentially the one implemented. Within this, the most interesting part for us is the
re-ordering of eventualities between states. This is implemented simply by calling the following predicate.
priority_function(Name, History, Goals_Before, Goals_After)
To ensure that something happens, even if the user does not provide a speciﬁc priority function, a default function is
provided which does not change the ordering.
priority_function(default, _, Goals, Goals)
5.2. Running example
In order to consider various ordering functions, including their deﬁnition and effects, we will just work with one simple
example. This is the speciﬁcation of a very minimal planetary rover agent, called rover. This has a very simple behaviour.
It is able to detect various aspects of its environment, for example water or minerals, and is able to invoke actions to
explore these sensed areas. The (very) basic agent description is as follows (we use a little ﬁrst-order notation to improve
readability).
rover
in: detect
out: explore
rules: detect(X) ⇒ ♦explore(X)
true ⇒ © (¬explore(mineral) ∨ ¬explore(water))
start ⇒ ¬explore(mineral) ∨ ¬explore(water)
Thus, the rover agent receives sensor inputs via the ‘detect’ predicate and generates exploration goals accordingly. The
above behaviour states that, if a sensor input is received then it is a goal of the agent to investigate that aspect at some
point in the future. The second and third rules ensure that the agent cannot explore two aspects simultaneously.
In the following, we will use the same basic agent, together with the same inputs, but will describe the effect when
the internal deliberation is modiﬁed (by changing the priority function). Generally, we would expect detect events to
occur rarely but, in order to consider the deliberative behaviour of this autonomous agent in extremis, we ensure that such
detection events occur very often.
We will simply run the above program for 8 states. In order to proceed, the execution requires a list of inputs represent-
ing sets of literals to be consumed at each execution step:
[ {detect(mineral),detect(waterl)}
{detect(mineral),detect(waterl)}
{detect(mineral),detect(waterl)}
{detect(mineral)}
{detect(waterl)}
{ }
{ }
{ } ]
We now examine what happens under various priority functions (i.e. under various deliberation strategies).
5.3. Alternative deliberation strategies
Default strategy. The default ordering strategy, ‘default’, leaves the order of eventualities unchanged. Thus, in executing
the rover program with the above input, we get the following output (re-formatted for readability).
**State 0: [detect(mineral), detect(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 1: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 2: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(water)]
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**State 3: [detect(mineral), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 4: [detect(water), explore(water)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(mineral)]
**State 5: [explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 6: [explore(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 7: []
Commitments: []
Here, we see the ‘detect’ inputs in each state which are received from the environment. In addition, we can see that
various commitments, i.e. outstanding eventualities, are subsequently generated.
So, in state 0, the agent receives detect(mineral) and detect(water) and so generates goals ♦explore(miner-
al) and ♦explore(water) for state 1 onwards (note that predicates not mentioned in the state are assumed to be false).
As there is no particular ordering on these, an arbitrary choice will be made and explore(mineral) is made true in state
1. Since explore(water) cannot now be made true, the goal ♦explore(water) remains as a commitment for the next
state (i.e. it is the only element in the list of commitments). However, in state 1, detect(mineral) is again received and so
♦explore(mineral) is added to the list of eventualities to be satisﬁed in state 2. Since the default approach is to not re-
order this list, and since the list is ordered by age (currently ♦explore(water) is ahead of ♦explore(mineral) in the
list), then at state 2 ♦explore(water) is satisﬁed by making explore(water) true. And so on. Thus, we see that with
the default strategy, there is a fair organisation of eventuality satisfaction, effectively alternating between explore(water)
and explore(mineral) in cases when both need to be satisﬁed.
Simply fair strategy. The ‘simply fair’ strategy explicitly captures a minimal form of fairness based upon whether eventualities
were satisﬁed in the previous state. Thus, the Prolog code deﬁning the ‘simply_fair’ function is as follows.
priority_function(simply_fair, _, [], []).
priority_function(simply_fair, LastState,
[sometime G | Rest], [sometime G | Att]) :-
member(G, LastState), !,
priority_function(simply_fair, LastState, Rest, AttRest),
append(AttRest, [sometime G], Att).
priority_function(simply_fair, LastState,
[sometime G | Rest], [sometime G | Att]) :-
priority_function(simply_fair, LastState, Rest, Att).
Essentially, this checks if any eventuality in the list to be satisﬁed has already been satisﬁed in the previous state. If it has,
then that eventuality is moved to the end of the list. Eventualities that have not been satisﬁed in the last state are not
re-ordered by this.
Now, if we execute the above program, but this time using the ‘simply_fair’ priority function, we get the following
output.
**State 0: [detect(mineral), detect(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 1: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 2: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(water)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(mineral)]
**State 3: [detect(mineral),explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
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Commitments: [sometime explore(mineral)]
**State 5: [explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 6: [explore(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 7: []
Commitments: []
Notice how this gives the same sequence of outputs as the “built in” ordering in the default example. This shows that,
within Prolog, we can code a simple ordering function that does retain fairness. We also note that this ordering is a fair
ordering strategy in the sense of Deﬁnition 4.1.
Simply unfair strategy. Finally, we deﬁne a deliberately ‘unfair’ strategy (called ‘simply_unfair’) that prioritises the goal
♦explore(mineral) over the goal ♦explore(water). Rather than reproducing the code again, we note that the list is
re-ordered so that if ♦explore(water) occurs before ♦explore(mineral) in the list, then it is subsequently moved
to after ♦explore(mineral).
In running the above program using this unfair priority function, we get
**State 0: [detect(mineral), detect(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 1: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 2: [detect(mineral), detect(water), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 3: [detect(mineral), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 4: [detect(water), explore(mineral)]
Commitments: [sometime explore(water)]
**State 5: [explore(water)]
Commitments: []
**State 6: []
Commitments: []
**State 7: []
Commitments: []
Notice how, in the ﬁrst 3 states, explore(mineral) was made true even though ♦explore(water) was outstanding.
Thus, if detect(mineral) were received continuously, then explore(water) would never be satisﬁed.
Notice how this ordering strategy is not a fair ordering, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.1 and so correctness of the temporal
execution is not guaranteed by Theorem 4.2.
6. Conclusions
In this article we have considered, at a foundational level, a key aspect of autonomous systems, namely the deliberation
that occurs within individual autonomous components. In particular, we have provided a relatively simple framework for
representing the goals than an agent has, and for subsequently executing these goals. Using this approach, we have shown
that by re-ordering the list of outstanding goals, we can produce deliberative agent behaviour. We also consider correctness
and implementation aspects, emphasising the simplicity, yet ﬂexibility, of the approach. The simplicity concerns not only
the logical theory, which is much less elaborate than corresponding BDI approaches, but also the implementation. The fact
that the user can supply arbitrary ordering functions (in Prolog) provides a very high degree of ﬂexibility.
We will next mention related work, followed by our future work in this area.
236 M. Fisher / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 223–2386.1. Related work
While a wide variety of logical theories, purporting to represent agents, have been proposed few, if any, have provided
the basis for an agent programming language. Exceptions include languages such as 3APL [12], April [39] and Agent-
Speak [44,6], and the early work on Agent-Oriented Programming [51,54]. Recent work on categorising and extending the
variety of goals available in such languages [29] comes close to using temporal eventualities as goals as in our approach.
BDI theory [48,46] provides a popular basis for describing agent-based systems, while the BDI architecture [47] provide
a model for deliberation. Although such systems have been successfully used in a number of areas, the link between imple-
mentations and the BDI agent theory is often tenuous. Consequently, the formalisation of deliberation [10] and the link from
high-level speciﬁcations to their low-level realisation are required and several works on deliberation in a BDI framework
have been produced, for example [11,50]. However, there are few papers combining theoretical basis, direct implementation
aspects, and strong links between, such as we provide in this article.
6.2. Future work
Our long term goal with this work is the provision of a formal framework for the speciﬁcation, animation and devel-
opment of distributed multi-agent systems. By basing our work on a simple temporal logic, for which there are already a
variety of proof methods, we have already outlined an approach to the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of multi-agent sys-
tems [21].
We have not been primarily concerned with multi-agent aspects here. However, we wish to have multiple agents of the
type described in this article, asynchronously executing, and communicating via broadcast message-passing [20]. Broadcast
message-passing is a natural communication mechanism to consider as it not only matches the logical view of computation
that we utilise, but it is very ﬂexible within distributed computer systems [4,7] and distributed AI [52].
As well as the notion of individual deliberating agents, we are also exploring stronger structuring mechanisms through
the ‘context’ extension [20]. This not only restricts the extent of an object’s communications, but also provides an extra
mechanism for the development of strategies for organisations. In particular, this provides the basis for agent cooperation,
competition and interaction.
Finally, as we move towards more expressive temporal notations, particularly ﬁrst-order temporal logic, and consider
multi-agent scenarios, so retaining the completeness of the execution mechanism becomes more diﬃcult. A central part of
future work is to examine such expressive extensions with respect to practical deliberation.
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